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Chairman, Committee on Grenada
Section on International Law and Practice
American Bar Association
1800 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
Dear Professor Gordon:
Thank you for giving us the opportunity to reiterate the legal position of
the United States for the report of your Committee on Grenada. We clearly
disagree with a number of the conclusions and judgments reached in the
report. However, I believe this office shares with you and the other mem-
bers of the Section the view that the way in which States articulate and
interpret principles of international law is perhaps even more important to
the development and maintenance of an effective international legal order
than are debates as to whether the facts in a particular case warranted the
invocation of such principles.
In the case of the action taken in Grenada, the legal position of the United
States was based upon the application of a combination of three well
established principles of international law to the unique and almost unprec-
edented circumstances presented by the murder of Prime Minister Bishop
and key members of his cabinet and the resultant collapse of functioning
institutions of government in Grenada. We consciously eschewed argu-
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ments which might imply a weakening of established international legal
restraints concerning the use of force. Accordingly, I consider it of the
utmost importance that in analyzing various legal theories that have been
put forward in the context of the Grenada mission, the report distinguish
clearly the positions adopted by the United States from the arguments of
others which do not represent the United States' view of international law.
Bases for U.S. Participation in the
Grenada Collective Security Action
The United States, both before and after the collective action, regarded
three well established legal principles as providing a solid legal basis for the
action: (1) the lawful governmental authorities of a State may invite the
assistance in its territory of military forces of other states or collective
organizations in dealing with internal disorder as well as external threats;
(2) regional organizations have competence to take measures to maintain
international peace and security, consistent with the purposes and principles
of the United Nations and OAS Charters; and (3) the right of States to use
force to protect their nationals. These grounds were clearly articulated in
testimony of Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth W. Dam before the House
Foreign Affairs Committee on November 2, 1983. I would emphasize that
the United States has not taken a position as to whether any one of these
grounds standing alone would have provided adequate support for the
action.
Request of Lawful Governmental Authority
The request of the Governor-General was regarded by the United States
as entitled to great moral and legal weight, in light of the collapse of other
established institutions of government in Grenada. We were unable to cite
his request in our first statements of the United States position because of
fears for his safety. At the time, his home was still surrounded by heavily
armed forces. Our internal legal analysis, however, relied heavily upon this
request from the time we were first advised of it on October 23. It was clearly
an important factor in the decision reached by the President on October 24
to respQnd favorably to the request of the Organization of Eastern Carib-
bean Stgttes (PECS) for United States assistance. The request of lawful
authority is a well established basis for providing military assistance,
whether the requesting State is seeking assistance in the exercise of its
inherent right of self defense recognized in Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter, or for other lawful purposes, such as maintenance of internal
order. See, I Lauterpacht, Oppenheim's International Law (1955), section
134 at p. 305. I am not aware of any authority for the proposition that
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military assistance in response to the request of lawful authority is contrary
to the prohibitions of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter.
Difficult legal issues may arise in determining what constitutes such lawful
authority in a situation of factional strife involving contending factions with
equivalent, colorable claims to authority. I would only point out that this
was not such a case. The Governor-General was not the leader of one
contending faction in a civil war; he was the recognized head of state of
longstanding tenure confronted by the breakdown of government in his
nation. Under both the Constitution of Grenada as well as the law and
practice of the British Commonwealth, the Governor-General possessed a
necessary residuum of power to restore order in these circumstances. See
generally S. A. DE SMITH, THE NEW COMMONWEALTH AND ITS CONSTITUTIONS
(1964), pp. 90-100; see also, The Guardian, Oct. 28, 1983 at p. 6, The
Economist, Nov. 9, 1983, at p. 45.
Competence of the OECS
The October 21 decision by the members of the Organization of Eastern
Caribbean States to take collective action provides further legal support for
the United States action. Three principal issues have been raised in this
regard: (1) Was the action consistent with the terms of the OECS Treaty?
(2) Do regional organizations have the capacity to take such action? (3) Is
the OECS a competent regional organization?
With respect to the first of these issues, much of the analysis to date has
focused exclusively on the language of Article 8 of the OECS Treaty. Artiale
8, however, defines the jurisdiction of the Defense and Seciirity Committee
of the OECS, a subordinate body under that treaty. The decision to take
military action on Grenada was reached by the heads of gcvernment of the
OECS nations, who-unlike the Defense and Security Committee-have
plenary authority under Article 6 of that Treaty. Article 3(2) of the OECS
Treaty expressly empowers the heads of government to pursue joint policies
in the field of mutual defense and security, and "such other activities
calculated to further the purposes of the Organization as the member States
may from time to time decide."
It is clear from statements of the OECS Secretariat that all OECS mem-
bers present at the October 21 meeting of heads of government voted in
favor of collective action. The provisions of Article 6 of the OECS Treaty
provide that actions may be taken without the presence of a Member State if
the absent state later ratifies the decision or abstains from voting. Given the
authority of the Governor-General discussed above, his request for collec-
tive action manifestly constituted ratification on the part of Grenada.
Perhaps the most important aspect of the debate over the OECS Treaty is
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that all members of the OECS regard the action taken as consistent with the
treaty. We submit that the views of the members of a regional treaty on
questions of treaty interpretation are entitled to a weight greater than those
of third-state commentators.
An issue of far greater import for the development of international law is
that of the proper scope of competence of regional organizations to act to
restore internal order in a member state. This issue requires careful analysis
in circumstances where an organization acts on its own initiative, absent the
invitation of the lawful authorities of the State concerned. In the case of
Grenada, however, this difficult issue ultimately was not posed. With the
invitation of the Governor-General, the member States of the OECS were
doing no more collectively than they could lawfully do individually in
responding to that request. Thus, the limits of what action a regional
organization may properly take absent such a request were not tested in this
case.
As a lawful action of a regional organization, the collective action of the
OECS falls within Article 52 of the United Nations Charter. We are not
aware of any serious contention that actions falling within the scope of
Article 52 could violate Article 2(4) of the Charter, any more than actions
taken at the request of lawful governmental authority could be considered to
do so. Similarly, the request of lawful authority and the decision of the
OECS bring the collective action within the scope of the OAS Charter.
Military assistance provided at the request of lawful authority cannot be
considered to violate the prohibitions of Articles 18 and 20 of that Charter,
and lawful actions of a regional organization such as the OECS fall within
the exceptions for regional arrangements set forth in Articles 22 and 28 of
the Charter. While the travaux preparatoire of these articles do not indicate
that the drafters consciously anticipated the development of collective
security arrangements in this hemisphere apart from the Rio Treaty and the
United Nations Charter, the travaux do indicate a clear decision not to refer
specifically to those treaties in the Charter provisions. Accordingly, there is
nothing to indicate that the drafters intended to foreclose the possibility of
other similar treaties falling within the scope of Articles 22 and 28.
On a practical level, the United States has long supported the concept of
dual adherences to the OAS Charter and the Rio Treaty by hemispheric
countries. However, the hemispheric system has developed differently. The
English speaking Caribbean countries-including the OECS states-are
members of the OAS but not party to the Rio Treaty. The OECS Treaty is in
effect the regional security arrangement for the Eastern Caribbean states.
(And one which provides for much greater integration in the conduct of
public affairs than either the OAS Charter or the Rio Treaty.) We see no
principled basis for distinguishing the Rio Treaty with 23 members, from the
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OECS Treaty with its 7 members. Since the Rio Treaty organ of consulta-
tion may take decisions by a 2/3 vote while the OECS Treaty authority
requires unanimity, in practice the difference in institutional restraints on
collective action under the two systems is not significant. We attach no
weight whatsoever to the relatively small size of the OECS member States.
All sovereign states regardless of population or area are entitled to enjoy the
benefits of regional security arrangements, which may in fact be more
important to states such as the OECS members for whom maintenance of
significant standing security forces is extremely burdensome. If it were the
case that the OAS Charter stood as a bar to the OECS states taking
collective security action, then it would seem that OAS membership would
impose burdens uniquely on these states which have the greatest need for
collective security.
Protection of Nationals
The third basis for United States participation was the need to protect the
1,000 United States citizens on Grenada who responsible United States
authorities considered to be threatened by the anarchic conditions on the
island. Under circumstances where all specific United States proposals for
the peaceful evacuation of United States personnel had been rejected by
those elements which we considered to pose the greatest threat to their
safety, the use of force to secure their evacuation was justified. Protection of
nationals is a well-established, narrowly drawn ground for the use of force
which has not been considered to conflict with the United Nations Charter.
While the United States has not asserted that protection of nationals stand-
ing alone would constitute a sufficient basis for all of the actions taken by the
collective force, it is important to note that it did clearly justify the landing of
United States military forces.
The Arguments the United States
Did Not Rely On
I would like to turn briefly to a discussion of the arguments which have
been put forward by some commentators, but which the United States did
not make in support of its actions on Grenada. We did not contend that the
action on Grenada was an exercise of the inherent right of self-defense
recognized in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter for the same reason
that the United States eschewed such arguments in support of the actions
taken by the United States and other Rio Treaty members in response to the
Cuban missile crisis. We did not assert that Article 2(4) had somehow fallen
into disuse or been overtaken by the practice of states; we regard it as an
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important and enduring principle of international law. Nor did we put
forward new interpretations of the language of Article 2(4). We did not
assert a broad doctrine of "humanitarian intervention." We relied instead
on the narrower, well-established ground of protection of United States
nationals. Finally, we have emphasized the mutually reinforcing nature of
the elements of the position we did take, and the unusual circumstances
posed by the breakdown of lawful authority and the request of the head of
state.
Effects on the Development of
International Law
We share the concern of the Section that the legal position adopted by the
United States in connection with the collective security action on Grenada
not be considered as standing for the proposition that international legal
restraints on the use of force have been eroding. We do not believe that it
can properly be so construed. To equate United States reliance on estab-
lished principles of international law with the Soviet Union's reliance on the
so-called "Brezhnev Doctrine"-which on its face contradicts the United
Nations Charter-could well have the effect of implying that international
law is either to be determined by the policies of large powers or by transitory
voting majorities in international fora, rather than through reference to
carefully constructed and enduring principles of universal applicability.
Similarly, whether a principle of law has been properly applied cannot be
judged without reference to the facts. The illegal Soviet invasions and
continuing occupations of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan involved undis-
guised efforts to replace one established government with another more
amenable to Soviet wishes. There are no facts analogous to the request of
the Governor-General which the Soviet Union can point to in either case.
The Soviet Union cannot rely on any invitation from a regional security
organization comprising autonomous and sovereign states acting within the
proper scope of authority of such organizations. The most recent factual
difference between the collective action on Grenada and the Soviet subjuga-
tion of two sovereign states was the prompt withdrawal from Grenada of all
United States' armed forces combat personnel. (The activities of our re-
maining 300 personnel are limited to noncombat assistance, such as training
and medical and reconstruction assistance.) We are looking forward to the
conduct of early elections in Grenada, which will demonstrate once again
the difference between United States and Soviet behavior in terms of
respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.
This Office is acutely conscious of the effect that United States legal
positions may have on the development of international legal restraints on
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the use of force. We also recognize the importance of reports of respected
bodies such as the Section in furthering understanding of the United States'
position as well as providing independent analysis of the complex issues
posed by any resort to force. I therefore wish to thank you again for this
opportunity to place on record the considerations which formed the basis of
the United States legal position concerning the action on Grenada.
Sincerely,
Davis R. Robinson
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